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This thesis is an in depth analysis of the higher costs per flight hour reported 
from Navy squadrons stationed in Japan. The purpose of the thesis is to identify, 
analyze and quantify the factors contributing to these higher costs. The study 
begins with a review of the current Navy funding and reporting systems, and a 
description of the basic costs of operating Navy aircraft. Then, a direct 
comparison of maintenance and repair costs is made between the squadrons of 
three Navy air wings. The analysis includes factors determined to play a major 
role in raising costs, as well as other minor factors that were uncovered during the 
research. The thesis concludes with a summary of findings and areas 
recommended for further study. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The United States Navy has maintained a forward deployed 
aircraft carrier in the western region of the Pacific Ocean 
since the later days of the Vietnam war. Since that time, 
both the aircraft carrier and her assigned air wing have been 
"homeported", or permanently assigned, to U. S. naval 
installations located in Japan. This agreement, of forward 
deploying an aircraft carrier in a foreign country, is 
particular to the Pacific theatre. The underlying reason for 
this arrangement stems from the vast expanse of the Pacific 
Ocean, when compared to the other major bodies of water in the 
world. Transit times for naval vessels, from the continental 
United States to areas of operation in the western Pacific and 
Indian Oceans, are four or more times greater than for their 
counterparts transiting to the North Atlantic Ocean or 
Mediterranean Sea. By maintaining a ready Carrier Battle 
Group in a forward deployed status, reaction time for any type 
of contingency operation in that area of the world is 
dramatically reduced. 
The forward deployed aircraft carrier and her assigned 
air wing (currently the USS INDEPENDENCE and Carrier Air Wing 
FIVE) fall under the administrative command of Commander, 
Naval Air Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC or CNAP). 
Acting in this capacity, CNAP is responsible for administering 
the Navy Flying Hour Program (FHP) for all aviation assets in 
the Pacific Fleet. It is through this Flying Hour Program 
that budgets are formulated and aviation activities are funded 
to fly. 
In these days of austere funding for defense programs, 
increasing emphasis is being placed on analysis of the 
financial and management control systems in place, in efforts 
to uncover areas where expenditures might be reduced. These 
efforts have been more than merely an attempt to locate 
possible areas of fraud, waste and abuse of appropriated 
funds. The current analyses are going much deeper, into the 
operational functions of the Navy, to determine if resources 
are allocated and consumed in the most efficient and effective 
manner. During such analysis, CNAP made a unusual discovery 
about the costs per flight hour of the forward deployed air 
wing, when compared with the five remaining air wings in the 
Pacific Fleet. Costs per flight hour for the forward deployed 
air wing ran consistently higher by a factor of approximately 
thirty percent. The general focus of this thesis is an 
examination of these cost per flight hour variances that 
result from the permanent assignment of a Carrier Air Wing to 
an overseas location. 
B.   OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to perform an in depth 
analysis of the factors that generate variances in the cost 
per flight hour determination within the Flying Hour Program. 
An assessment of factors will be made to determine their 
application to the peculiar arrangement of operating a Carrier 
Air Wing from a foreign shore. The resulting factors will be 
quantified to measure their individual contribution to the 
overall variances that have previously been observed. For 
completeness, a listing will be included of the factors which 
are deemed too difficult, if not impossible, to accurately 
quantify. The financial impact of these cost variances on the 
management of the Flying Hour Program' at the Type Command 
level will also be explored. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations will be drawn from the research to help ensure 
the resources of the Flying Hour Program are allocated in the 
best interests of Naval Aviation, and the Navy as a whole. 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the carrier-based 
tactical aviation squadrons under the cognizance of Commander, 
Naval Air Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet. However, the 
implications from this research may be applicable to most of 
Naval Aviation, particularly carrier-based aircraft squadrons. 
To preserve the accuracy of research data, all cost 
comparisons will be made between the same type and model of 
aircraft, employed under similar operating conditions. The 
cost variations will be the difference between the actual 
costs per flight hour for individual air wings by aircraft 
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S), rather than the actual versus 
budgeted costs. 
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions are addressed in the 
body of the thesis: 
1. What are the major factors that contribute to the 
experience of higher costs per flight hour for a 
forward deployed air wing? 
2. To what degree do each of these factors contribute to 
the overall variance in costs? 
3. What are the other possible factors, which are 
difficult if not impossible to quantify, that might 
also be contributing to the cost differences? 
4. What is the fiscal impact that funding the forward 
deployed air wing at a higher level has on the 
remaining air wings in the Pacific Fleet? 
D.   METHODOLOGY 
The data used for this thesis were obtained through 
professional materials from Navy commands, government 
publications, books, articles, previous theses, and 
interviews. Personal interviews were used extensively to 
supplement the limited materials published on the topics and 
issues. Interviewees included the COMNAVAIRPAC Comptroller, 
as well as both the operational and financial CNAP Flying Hour 
Program Managers. In addition, persons with previous 
experience in squadrons from Carrier Air Wing FIVE were 
interviewed to get the "Japan perspective." The research made 
heavy use of official Navy documentation, including historical 
cost data and flight hour records. The working papers from a 
past study conducted at CNAP using information collected from 
Budget Operating Target Reports (BOR's) and Flight Hour Cost 
Reports (FHCR's) were used as a starting point for this 
research, and the basis for subsequent data collection. 
E.   ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I 
provides the introduction and purpose for this document. It 
states the research questions, the objectives to be 
accomplished, the scope of the analysis, the methodology to be 
employed, as well as the organization of the thesis. 
Chapter II presents a detailed explanation of the Cost 
Per Flight Hour (CPH) determination at the type commander 
level. The inputs are described, as well as the various cost 
pools associated with operating Navy aircraft. The procedures 
and complications associated with funding the Flying Hour 
Program are introduced. 
Chapter III describes the methodology employed in this 
study of Cost Per Flight Hour variances. The parameters used 
for comparison are presented, as well as the factors used to 
screen the data for inclusion. 
Chapter IV provides an analysis of the research results 
and attempts to quantify the contribution of individual 
factors into the overall variance of flight hour costs. The 
impact of these cost differences on the management of the 
Flying Hour Program is examined. 
Chapter V presents conclusions to address the research 
questions, along with any related problems uncovered during 
the research phase. Suggestions for further research and some 
additional remarks also are included. 
II.     COST PER  FLIGHT HOUR 
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
The most significant variable used in the management of 
the Navy Flying Hour Program is the Cost Per Flight Hour 
(CPH). It is used extensively in preparing budgets, 
allocating funds, and tracking the efficiency of execution of 
the flight hour dollars. It is calculated using different 
methods at the various levels of management in the Flying Hour 
Program. This fact accounts for many of the problems 
encountered in tracking and reporting costs at different 
levels in the organization. This chapter will address the CPH 
at the type commander level, including the calculations 
employed at COMNAVAIRPAC. The cost pools associated with the 
CPH determination will be introduced, along with some of the 
peculiarities of data collection and submission. In addition, 
some funding background will be offered to facilitate later 
analysis of the effects of higher CPH rates on the remaining 
air wings. 
B. DETERMINING COST PER FLIGHT HOUR 
In simplest terms, CPH is the total cost of operating 
aircraft (fuel, parts, maintenance, etc.) divided by the total 
number of hours flown. However, the equation gets more 
complicated with the allocation of miscellaneous costs and the 
requirement of soliciting cost inputs from various sources. 
1. Costs at the User Level 
The financial obligations incurred by operational units 
in direct support of the Flying Hour Program fall under two 
primary budget lines, known as Operational Target Functional 
Categories (OFC's) [Ref. l:Encl. (1), pp.1-2]: 
• QFC-Q1: Primarily Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO); 
includes petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), as well 
as other support and maintenance material (e.g., 
aviator's flight equipment, administrative supplies, 
etc.) . Also included are some minor AOM items. These 
costs are largely accounted for under the 7F (Fuel) and 
7B (Administrative and Flight Equipment) funding codes, 
and are predominantly incurred at the squadron level. 
• OFC-50:   Primarily Aircraft Operations Maintenance 
(AOM); includes Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) 
consumables and repairables (which includes both 
Organizational level (OMA) and Intermediate level (IMA) 
maintenance), Aviation Depot Level Repair (AVDLR), and 
Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) item repair. 
This category also includes AOM performed while a unit 
is deployed away from its home station, where it is 
funded by an AFM OPTAR given to the tenant maintenance 
facility involved. These costs are largely accounted 
for under the 7L (AFM, Consumables) and 9S (AVDLR) 
funding codes, and are predominantly incurred by 
aviation-related ships and shore facilities. 
Totals for each of these categories, separated into aircraft 
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) and Type Equipment Code (TEC) 
whenever possible, are submitted to the Type Commander in the 
formats described in the next section. 
2. Inputs to the Type Commander 
CNAP receives the expense and costing information 
generated by each of the aviation-related units under its 
cognizance in two forms.  Flight Hour Cost Reports (FHCR's) 
are submitted by shore stations, while ships and squadron 
inputs are submitted through Budget Operating Target Reports 
(BOR's). These reports are used at the Type Commander level 
to [Ref. 2, p. 51]: 
• Evaluate the unit  (as well as the total Force) 
respective financial situation. 
• Support subsequent fiscal year budget decisions and 
submissions. 
• Measure ship/station/squadron budget performance. 
• Prepare required FHP management control reports. 
Not only do the Flight Hour Cost Reports and Budget OPTAR 
Reports update the Type Commander on the fiscal status of each 
reporting unit, they also serve as a check and balance for the 
individual ship/station/squadron to confirm its financial 
situation. This is to avoid the legal complications of 
overspending funds appropriated by Congress. [Ref. 3, p. 26] 
Flight Hour Cost Reports are submitted monthly by shore 
facility comptrollers via Priority message. They contain all 
obligations incurred during the previous month, with totals 
listed as dollar amounts. They are the primary source of 
information on AVDLR and AFM costs for non-deployed squadrons. 
[Ref. 4, p. 31] 
Budget OPTAR Reports are submitted on the same monthly 
schedule from both aviation-related ships and squadrons. The 
inputs from aircraft carriers contain information similar to 
the shore station FHCRs.  It is the primary source of AVDLR 
and AFM costs for squadrons in a deployed status. In 
addition, the BORs list the OPTAR remaining for comparison 
with budget records at CNAP. 
The squadron BORs contain obligation totals for aircraft 
operations (AFO), along with AFM costs incurred at the 
Organizational level. They list information on the number of 
aircraft assigned, flight hours flown during the month, and a 
cumulative total of flight hours for the fiscal year. The 
type of fuel and total gallons consumed during the month are 
also included. [Ref. 5, p. 33] 
Information from these reports is compiled by the Force 
Comptroller and distributed for both local management of the 
Flying Hour Program and to satisfy the TYCOM reporting 
requirements. 
3.   Cost Pools 
The cost of operating Navy aircraft can be broken down 
into four basic cost pools:  Fuel, OMA, IMA, and AVDLR. 
• Fuel - The cost of aviation fuel, engine oil, and 
lubricants. 
• OMA - Organizational Maintenance Activity; the costs 
incurred at the squadron level to maintain the 
aircraft. OMA costs are entirely for consumables, or 
items that are more economical to replace than to 
repair. 
• IMA - Intermediate Maintenance Activity; the cost 
associated with intermediate level repair and 
maintenance. These are Aircraft Intermediate 
Maintenance Department (AIMD) costs and are related to 
both consumables and repairables. 
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• AVDLR - Aviation Depot Level Repair; the cost of major 
component rework, repair, and replacement beyond the 
capability level of AIMD. For most aircraft T/M/S, 
AVDLR represents the largest and most variable cost 
pool. [Ref. 4, p. 36] 
From these four cost pools the total obligation for each 
aircraft can be calculated using the formula discussed in the 
following section. 
4.  Calculating the Cost Per Flight Hour 
A six-step process is used to calculate the total Cost 
Per Flight Hour for each aircraft Type/Model/Series in the 
Pacific Fleet inventory. This process must be employed 
separately for each aircraft T/M/S, and can become quite 
tedious when the numbers are compiled manually. A simplified 
version of the process, using the F-14A as an example, is 
outlined in Figure 1. 
First, all the costs from the 7L funding code which have 
been charged to that category of aircraft are collected from 
the Budget OPTAR Reports and Flight Hour Cost Reports. This 
number, from each reporting activity, is then divided by the 
total 7L non-miscellaneous costs for that activity to provide 
a ratio for allocating 7L miscellaneous costs. The aircraft 
T/M/S 7L costs are then combined with the allocated portion of 
7L miscellaneous costs to provide the "Adjusted 7L Cost." 
This same formula for allocating miscellaneous costs is then 
applied to the costs from the 9S funding code, with the result 
being the "Adjusted 9S Cost." 
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CALCULATING AIRCRAFT CPH 
Example: F-14A 
7L = AFM, CONSUMABLES 9S = AVDLR 
1. For each BOR from CV's, and FHCR from NAS's: 
F-14A 7L costs   X 7L misc costs = F-14A misc cost portion + F-14A 7L costs = Adjusted F-14A 
7L non misc costs ^ cost 
F-14A 9S costs   X 9S misc costs = F-14A misc cost portion + F-14A 9S costs = Adjusted F-14A 
9S non misc costs K  cost 
2. Add up all Adjusted F-14A 7L and 9S costs from each location = Total Adjusted 7L/9S cost 
3. Add up all F-14A flight hours from squadron BORs = Total F-14A Flight Hours 
4. Add up all F-14A 7F costs from squadron BORs = Total F-14A 7F cost 
5. Add up all F-14A accounting adjustments from DAO = Total Accounting Adjustments 
6. Total Adi 7L + Total Adi 9S + Total 7F + Total Acct Adj = F-14A COST PER FLIGHT HOUR 
Total F-14A Flight Hours 
Figure 1.  How T/M/S Costs Per Flight Hour are calculated. 
The second step is to combine the Adjusted 7L and 9S 
Costs from each location to get the "Total Adjusted 7L and 9S 
Costs" for that particular aircraft. The third and fourth 
steps of the process involve acquiring and totalling 
information from the individual squadron BORs. The total 
flight hours for each aircraft T/M/S are provided in those 
documents, as are the 7F (Fuel) costs from each squadron. The 
fifth step in the process is to find and compile all the 
accounting adjustments for that aircraft, issued from the 
Defense Accounting Office (DAO). 
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When all the costs have been captured using the preceding 
steps, the sixth and final step in calculating the CPH is 
simply to divide the costs by the total number of hours flown. 
For analysis purposes, the Cost Per Flight Hour can be figured 
for each of the funding codes individually (7F, 7L, and 9S), 
as well as for the total CPH of that aircraft. [Ref. 6] 
What this procedure is unable to determine is the total 
CPH of a particular squadron flying that category of aircraft. 
If information on individual squadron CPH was easily 
calculated, then a direct comparison of Japan-based squadrons 
with the CONUS-based squadrons could be easily accomplished. 
For this reason, COMNAVAIRPAC has expressed interest in a 
study of this nature. 
C.   FUNDING THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM 
At all levels in the funding chain for the Flying Hour 
Program, from Congress down through the Type Commander, the 
emphasis is on achieving a specific level of readiness. The 
substitute measure used to estimate this level of readiness is 
referred to as Primary Mission Readiness (PMR). PMR is 
actually a number that represents the amount of flight hours 
required to ensure that all flight crews are proficient in 
their respective Primary Mission Areas (PMA). But, for 
funding purposes, PMR is usually referred to as a percentage 
of that flight hour requirement. For example, if a squadron 
were funded to be fully proficient in all their assigned PMAs, 
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they would be funded at 100% PMR. Unfortunately, this is 
rarely the case. In fact, Congress and the budgeteers at 
NAVCOMPT have historically funded the Flying Hour Program in 
the region of 85-87% PMR [Ref. 7]. 
The fact that Naval Aviation is not initially funded at 
100% PMR places additional pressure on the TYCOMs and other 
Flying Hour Program managers to make up the difference. The 
process that CNAP has traditionally used to compensate for 
this shortfall is to fund squadrons according to their 
activity level. The activity level is determined by the where 
a squadron is in its "turn-around cycle." 
Deployments and turn-around cycles will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter. For the purposes of this 
discussion, the turn-around cycle is simply the eighteen month 
period used for scheduling aircraft carrier deployments, along 
with all the requisite aircraft and air wing training in 
preparation for those deployments. Because the flight hour 
requirements vary for each stage of the turn-around cycle, air 
wings homeported in the continental United States (CONUS) are 
typically funded on a scale similar to the following [Ref. 4, 
p. 47] : 
• Month 1: Personnel turnover and leave 25% PMR 
• Months 2-9: Turn-around training 78% PMR 
• Months 10-12: Pre-deployment training 105% PMR 
• Months 13-18: Forward deployment period 125% PMR 
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For the forward deployed air wing, readiness requirements 
dictate that funding is at or above 100% PMR for the majority 
of the turn-around cycle [Ref. 7] . This is due not only to 
their unique mission of maintaining a forward presence, but 
also the close proximity of potentially hostile nations. The 
implications of funding the forward deployed air wing at a 
higher level will be addressed in Chapter IV. 
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III.  DATA FOR COMPARISON 
A.   BASICS OF THIS STUDY 
This chapter delineates the procedures used to collect 
and analyze the data for this study. The time period covered, 
as well as the specific areas for cost comparison are 
presented. In addition, the cost categories deemed irrelevant 
for the purposes of this study are discussed. 
The basics of this research entail a comparison of the 
intermediate maintenance (IMA) and Aviation Depot Level Repair 
(AVDLR) costs of three air wings over a twenty-one month 
period. The air wings used and their associated aircraft 
carriers are: Air Wing Five onboard the USS Independence (CV- 
62) , Air Wing Eleven onboard the USS Lincoln (CVN-72) , and Air 
Wing Fifteen onboard the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). Costs Per 
Flight Hour are calculated separately for deployed and non- 
deployed operations to assess the ability of the applicable 
accounting systems to capture costs. The cost data for Air 
Wing Five is compiled from USS Independence Budget OPTAR 
Reports (BOR) . The cost data for Air Wings Eleven and Fifteen 
is from the aircraft carrier BORs, as well as solicited inputs 
from the applicable shore station comptrollers. Flight hour 
information for each of the squadrons was obtained from 
COMNAVAIRPAC records. 
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B.   DATA SELECTION 
The intention of this study is to define the factors that 
contribute most to the observed disparity of flight hour costs 
for the squadrons of Air Wing Five, forward deployed in Japan. 
To make the data comparable, the CONUS based squadrons used 
for comparison were screened on the basis of deployment 
schedules, air wing composition, and aircraft types. 
1.  Deployment Schedules 
There are recognized cost differences between deployed 
squadrons and those in some stage of pre-deployment training. 
The additional costs of operating from the carrier deck are 
due in part to the harsh salt water environment and additional 
aircraft failures induced from catapult launches and arrested 
landings. In the opinion of the CNAP Force Comptroller, the 
costs incurred by Air Wing Five are nearly equal to the 
remaining air wings during periods of deployment. The 
assertion in this case is that the non-deployed cost 
difference is actually greater than the previously observed 
figure of 30%. [Ref. 8] 
To compare the deployment costs, the squadrons selected 
for comparison must have completed one extended deployment 
during the time period of this study. For a comparison of 
non-deployed costs, the time period required must encompass at 
least an entire turn-around cycle. A period of twenty-one 
months was determined to be suitable for both of these 
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purposes. This interval also ensures the critical periods 
immediately prior to, and following deployment are included 
for all three air wings. 
Costs were collected for the time period from October 
1992 through June 1994. The air wings/carriers were deployed 
on the following dates during that period: 
• CVW-5/CV-62        17 November 1993 - 17 March 1994 
• CVW-ll/CVN-72        15 June 1993 - 15 December 1993 
• CVW-15/CV-63 03 November 1992 - 03 May 1993 
It is important to note that the cruise for the CVW-5/CV-62 
team was only four months in duration, as opposed to the 
standard six-month deployment. This is due to the reduced 
transit time for the USS Independence to operating areas in 
the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf. The time spent "on station" in 
the Gulf was actually the same for all three carriers. 
2.  Air Wing Composition 
All Navy air wings are not created equally. The number 
of squadrons and type of aircraft assigned varies depending on 
the specific air wing. This circumstance is normally due to 
the introduction of new aircraft into the fleet. Since the 
aircraft are purchased and produced over periods of many 
years, they are put into service in the same manner. It is 
not uncommon to have one or more squadrons transitioning to a 
new Type/Model/Series of aircraft during a turn-around. 
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Additionally, some recent top-level decisions concerning 
aircraft in the Navy inventory have contributed to this 
disparity in air wings. The reduction and retirement of the 
A-6 aircraft, along with a drastic reduction in the number of 
F-14 squadrons, have both served to produced a great deal of 
shuffling among air wings. 
The current compositions of the three air wings are 
listed in Figure 2. The individual squadrons are listed for 
each air wing, along with the aircraft flown by that squadron. 
Although they are not identical, the differences are 
considered minor and do not affect the results of this study. 
To ensure this, not all of the squadrons listed below are used 
in the cost comparison. The following section lists the 
aircraft categories that were included, and highlights any 
reasons for exclusion. 
AIR WING COMPOSITIONS 
CVW-5 CVW-11 CVW-15 
USS Independence USS Lincoln USS Kitty Hawk 
VF-21      F-14A VF-213      F-14A VF-51      F-14A 
VF-154     F-14A VMFA-314  F/A-18A VF-111     F-14A 
VFA-192  F/A-18C VFA-22    F/A-18C VFA-27   F/A-18A 
VFA-195  F/A-18C VFA-94    F/A-18C VFA-97   F/A-18A 
VA-115      A-6E VÄ-95        A-6E VA-52       A-6E 
VAQ-136    EA-6B VAQ-135     EA-6B VAQ-134    EA-6B 
VS-21       S-3B VS-29        S-3B VS-37       S-3B 
VAW-115     E-2C VAW-117      E-2C VAW-114     E-2C 
HS-12      SH-3H HS-6   H/SH-60F/H HS-4  H/HS-60F/H 
Figure 2.  Air Wing Compositions as of 1 June 1994 
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3.  Aircraft Types 
Cost information was collected from twenty-three separate 
squadrons for comparison purposes. Six different aircraft 
categories are represented by these squadrons. These aircraft 
Type/Model/Series are: F-14A, F/A-18C, A-6E, EA-6B, S-3B, and 
E-2C. Although squadrons VFA-27 and VFA-97 from CVW-15 fly 
the F/A-18A aircraft, these costs were considered reasonably 
similar for direct comparison with F/A-18C squadrons. 
However, cost information from the Marine F/A-18A squadron, 
VMFA-314, was not included due to the differences in the 
accounting and tracking systems employed by the Marine Corps. 
Cost information from the helicopter squadrons (HS-12, 
HS-6, and HS-4) was also omitted from this comparison. HS-12 
is one of the last Navy squadrons flying the SH-3H aircraft 
for carrier operations. Results from a direct comparison with 
squadrons flying the newer SH-60 series aircraft would be 
inconclusive at best. 
From the data that was included, it was noted that CVW-11 
has only one F-14A squadron. Until recently, the standard for 
Navy air wings has been two fighter squadrons. A top-level 
shift in emphasis from the F-14 to the F/A-18 aircraft has 
necessitated some marked changes in this area. VF-213 is the 
first F-14 "super" squadron, meaning the squadron has 16 
aircraft instead of the usual 10 or 11. There are some 
unforeseen effects on the costs for this larger squadron that 
are highlighted in the last section of this chapter. 
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C. 7L AND 9S COSTS 
The specific costs to be compared in this study are 7L 
and 9S costs. A more detailed description of cost categories 
is included in Chapter II of this thesis. Costs from the 7L 
funding code include both consumables and repairables, and the 
majority of these costs are incurred at the intermediate 
maintenance level. The 9S funding code is for Aviation Depot 
Level Repair (AVDLR), and these costs are for the high cost, 
or "big ticket" items that are beyond the capability of 
intermediate level repair. Aircraft engines are an example of 
a major contributor to this cost category. 
The reason these cost categories were chosen are due to 
their low degree of direct correlation to the amount of flight 
hours flown by the subject sguadron. Much of the expense 
generated in these categories over the long run can be viewed 
as the "fixed cost" of doing business. But, for shorter 
periods of time, such as one or two months, these costs are 
extremely variable. The twenty-one month period selected for 
use in this study is considered ample time to dampen much of 
the variability of these costs, thereby providing useful data 
for comparison. 
D. OTHER COSTS 
Costs incurred at the sguadron level, along with 
miscellaneous costs, were excluded from this comparison. 
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Squadron level costs include a small portion of maintenance 
costs, mainly for consumables, and the cost of fuel for 
operating the aircraft. Although fuel costs account for 
approximately 36% of the total cost of operating Navy aircraft 
[Ref. 9, p. 47], these costs were not included in the data 
because of their high direct correlation to flight hours and 
squadron activity level. A previous study found the degree of 
variation caused by these costs to be on the magnitude of 
2.4%, a relatively small portion of the total variation of 
approximately 30% [Ref. 10, p. 73] . By excluding these costs 
from the data, the true magnitude of the variations caused by 
the remaining 7L and 9S costs can be more accurately measured 
and analyzed. 
Miscellaneous costs are the costs that are not directly 
attributable to an aircraft Type/Model/Series. They can be 
viewed as the indirect costs of doing business. An example of 
costs in this category would include the purchase and 
maintenance of ground support equipment, along with other 
equipment used for the common support of both local and 
transient aircraft. Because the miscellaneous costs are 
allocated based on a proportional share of direct costs, 
including them in this study would only serve to exaggerate 
the differences or variances from the 7L and 9S cost 
categories. In other words, the aircraft T/M/S with the 
largest share of traceable costs from each activity will also 
bear the largest burden or share of miscellaneous costs. 
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Although this may be an effective system for allocating 
miscellaneous costs, it would only cloud the issue and 
disguise the data in this study. The intention here is not to 
determine the total "true" cost of operating and maintaining 
Navy aircraft. Rather, it is merely to examine and analyze 
the cost variances that exist, and that can only be 
accomplished by using direct costs. It can be assumed that 
the difference between the cost variations generated from this 
study, and the previously observed variations of nearly 30%, 
are due largely to the distortion caused by the allocation of 
miscellaneous costs. 
E.   RESULTS OF COMPARISON 
Tables 1-4 on the following pages provide the results of 
a direct comparison of the flight hours and subject costs for 
the aircraft in each of the three air wings. Hours and costs 
are further broken down into deployed and non-deployed time 
periods, along with the totals for each category. Table 1 is 
a comparison of the flight hours recorded for each aircraft 
type. Tables 2-4 provide a comparison of the direct 7L, 9S, 
and total 7L/9S costs per flight hour, respectively. The 
numbers in the shaded boxes represent the highest cost per 
flight hour observed for each operational category (deployed, 
non-deployed, total) and type of aircraft. 
Some plausible explanations are available for the 
instances when the highest costs per flight hour were observed 
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in air wings other than CVW-5. In Table 2, the higher 7L 
costs for the F-14s of CVW-11 are directly attributable to the 
air wing composition. With only one, larger than normal F-14 
squadron in CVW-11, the total hours flown by that squadron 
were just over 50% of the average total F-14 hours flown by 
the other two air wings. However, since VF-213 has 16 
aircraft instead of the normal 10 or 11, the F-14 maintenance 
costs are closer to 75% of the normal air wing average. In 
the case of CVW-11, the F-14 costs per flight hour are driven 
higher by fact that costs and flight hours have not decreased 
by the same proportion. It is interesting to note that this 
condition occurs only with the 7L costs, and not with the 9S 
costs as well. 
The consistently higher costs of the F/A-18A squadrons of 
CVW-15 are due to the employment of older model aircraft. The 
costs per flight hour are driven up considerably by the 
requirements to perform additional airframe modifications and 
capability upgrades. These procedures are often very 
expensive, and can take anywhere from a week to several months 
to complete. Virtually all procedures of this nature are 
conducted at squadron home stations, or at a Naval Aviation 
Depot (NADEP). This explains why these higher costs are 
observed only during the time periods when these squadrons are 
not deployed. 
The explanations for higher costs per flight hour in S-3B 
and E-2C squadrons outside of CVW-5 are unknown.  These could 
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possibly be a result of aircraft accidents resulting in 
substantial damage, or a higher than average number of engine 
replacements. Either of these occurrences would account for 
a dramatic increase in squadron costs, but data are not 
readily available to test these hypotheses. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
A. GENERAL 
In this chapter, the causal factors that contribute to 
the higher costs per flight hour in Japan-based squadrons are 
analyzed. The factors are presented in order of importance, 
based upon their contribution to the overall variance. The 
factors classified as "major" contributors include: 
logistics, operating tempo (OPTEMPO), carrier operations, and 
accounting system differences. Other contributing factors, of 
indeterminate magnitude, consist of squadron spending habits, 
access to training facilities, and personnel matters. This 
chapter concludes with an assessment of the consequences of 
consistently funding one air wing at a higher level than 
others. 
B. ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
The logistic complications of operating from a foreign 
shore play a major role in raising aircraft operating costs. 
The higher costs, when observed from the viewpoint of 
logistics, are a product of two related components. First, 
forward deployed squadrons do not enjoy the economies of scale 
inherent to squadrons based in the continental United States 
(CONUS). Being co-located with other squadrons of the same 
aircraft type, in addition to a large Fleet Replacement 
Squadron (FRS), provides the considerable benefits of sharing 
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supply lines and maintenance expertise. Along with this, the 
close proximity of fleet maintenance support facilities lend 
a comparative advantage in both time and expense. 
The second component of this eguation is the penalty that 
Japan-based squadrons must pay in shipping and handling costs. 
With the inception of the reimbursable Defense Business 
Operations Fund (DBOF) in DoD and the Navy, these added costs 
are more apparent to the consumer. Since the squadrons are 
ultimately the end-user for these parts and supplies, they 
must pick up the tab to ensure their continued availability. 
C.   OPTEMPO 
The mission of Air Wing Five is unique because of its 
location and proximity to potentially hostile nations. These 
squadrons can ill afford lapses in readiness or combat 
capabilities. To guard against such occurrences, the 
squadrons of Air Wing Five must maintain a higher OPTEMPO than 
their counterparts stationed in CONUS. 
These squadrons are by no means in peak fighting 
condition continuously. Attempting to maintain such a level 
of readiness would place undue strain on both people and 
equipment. But, in contrast to other squadrons, a higher 
minimum level of proficiency must be maintained throughout the 
entire turn-around cycle. Adhering to these higher standards 
of readiness demands a corresponding increase in OPTEMPO for 
the squadrons of Air Wing Five. 
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1.   "Tip of the Spear" Mentality 
One consequence of being forward deployed is carrying the 
banner as the United States first line of defense. To remain 
effective in this role, sailors and aviators develop what is 
referred to as a "tip of the spear" mentality. This is 
nothing more than the simple realization that, at any time and 
on very short notice, they can be called upon to enforce the 
policy or defend the interests of the United States abroad. 
This awareness injects a sense of urgency into routine 
decisions, especially those pertaining to readiness. 
In terms of maintenance, there is increased pressure to 
maintain aircraft in a fully mission capable (FMC) status. To 
illustrate this point, consider an aircraft with a maintenance 
discrepancy on a particular weapons system. For a non- 
deployed squadron based in CONUS, this aircraft would still be 
available for use on the flight schedule to complete any 
training flight not requiring an operable weapons system. 
Maintenance to repair the weapons system could be deferred 
until it was convenient, without significantly impacting 
training. 
Deployed squadrons, on the other hand, do not enjoy this 
flexible policy with respect to maintenance scheduling. To 
meet the more demanding nature of the mission, fully operable 
weapons systems are considered essential for flight under 
deployed conditions. The struggle to maintain FMC aircraft 
drives up maintenance costs for all squadrons during periods 
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of deployment. For the squadrons stationed in Japan, striving 
to maintain combat-ready aircraft is a full-time occupation. 
2.  Number of Aircraft Assigned 
Modern military aircraft are a limited commodity due to 
the huge expense of technology. Their numbers have dwindled 
further in recent "downsizing" years, as more have been lost 
to accidents and obsolescence than were replaced. Forced to 
work with limited assets, it is not uncommon for squadrons to 
trade aircraft. In the F-14 community, a squadron returning 
from deployment and anticipating a "stand-down" period may 
transfer as many as half of its aircraft to other squadrons. 
These aircraft are replaced gradually during the turn-around 
cycle. Often, the squadron does not return to full strength 
until it is ready to deploy again. This arrangement results 
in a substantial cost savings for the squadrons that are not 
burdened with the expense of maintaining a full complement of 
aircraft. 
Air Wing Five, by virtue of its isolation, does not 
normally participate in this aircraft swapping. They do 
participate in one-for-one trades on some occasions, usually 
initiated to facilitate the return of an aircraft to CONUS for 
specific maintenance needs. The net result of such an 
exchange has no effect on the overall number of aircraft in 
the squadrons of Air Wing Five. Maintaining a full complement 
of aircraft is essential for ensuring aircraft availability 
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and promoting combat readiness, but it does not come without 
additional costs. 
D.   CARRIER OPERATIONS 
The most challenging environment for aircraft operations 
is from the deck of an aircraft carrier. It is equally 
demanding on both men and machines. The squadrons of Air Wing 
Five operate in the carrier environment more than any other 
Navy air wing. This fact is due not only to higher OPTEMPO 
and readiness requirements, but it is also a result of 
international agreements between the United States and Japan. 
One stipulation in the contract to permanently station an 
aircraft carrier in Japan places a limit on the consecutive 
days that the USS Independence may remain in port, with 
exceptions only for extenuating circumstances. Since the 
aircraft carrier alone has limited self-defense capability, 
the air wing must often accompany the ship to sea. In the 
previous chapter, the direct comparison of flight hour costs 
showed that maintenance costs are higher during periods of 
deployment. Some explanations for these increased costs are 
revealed by a closer examination of the factors at work in the 
carrier environment. 
1.   Catapult and Landing Induced Failures 
The tremendous forces involved in launch and recovery 
evolutions aboard the carrier stress the aircraft to their 
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limits. Numerous maintenance failures are a direct result of 
flying in this regime. All of the aircraft components, 
especially the intricate and expensive avionics systems, are 
prone to damage induced by catapult launches and arrested 
landings. In addition, the useful life of consumable items, 
such as aircraft tires and arresting hooks, are extremely 
limited under these conditions. 
2.  Working Environment 
Salt air and limited working space present additional 
hazards to aircraft operating in the carrier environment. The 
damaging effects of salt air and water are a constant concern 
for aircraft maintenance technicians. Additional maintenance 
costs are incurred through parts lost to salt intrusion, and 
in complying with extensive corrosion prevention programs. 
Moving aircraft around on the flight deck and in the 
hangar bay is sometimes viewed as a complex ballet. However, 
even this evolution is not without occasional damage to one or 
more aircraft. The structural repairs required after such an 
incident can range from minimal to those that cause a complete 
loss of the aircraft. The incidence of foreign object damage 
(FOD) to aircraft engines is also much higher on the carrier 
flight deck. When ingested through an multi-million dollar 
aircraft engine, objects as small as a bolt or a piece of wire 
can cause irreparable damage. 
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E.   ACCOUNTING SYSTEM DIFFERENCES 
The Aviation Operations Maintenance (AOM) costs for air 
wings stationed in CONUS need to be assembled from various 
sources. These sources include both aircraft carriers and 
naval air stations. Although AOM costs are accounted for in 
a consistent manner by the aircraft carriers, the air bases 
accumulate and categorize costs in a manner consistent with 
the needs and desires of the individual stations [Ref. 6]. To 
complicate the matter further, costs must often be collected 
from bases other than the squadron home station to account for 
squadron detachments and other transient activities. 
In contrast, the framework in place for capturing and 
reporting cost information for squadrons based in Japan is 
unique. The aircraft carrier USS Independence is the single 
collection point for all financial data pertaining to Air Wing 
Five aircraft. This arrangement is not only better for 
capturing direct costs, but also leads to a more accurate 
allocation of miscellaneous costs. Here, the costs of 
operating aircraft are not spread over several different ships 
and stations. As an added bonus, the probability of 
accounting errors is dramatically reduced by the simplicity of 
the system. 
From this perspective, one can assert that a significant 
portion of the higher expenses reported by Japan-based 
squadrons are not additional costs at all.  Rather, they 
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result from a more accurate reflection of the "true" costs of 
operating and maintaining Navy aircraft. 
F.   OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
Additional factors that drive up the costs of operating 
aircraft in Japan are difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify. These factors are intangibles, related to 
differences in financial incentives, opportunities, and 
personnel. Although the contribution of these factors to 
overall cost variances may be relatively minor, they are 
presented here for completeness. 
1.   Incidence of "Learned Spending" 
Money managers at the squadron level strive to spend 100% 
of their allotted funding. Any command that exceeds its 
funding level must petition up the chain of command for 
additional funds, if they exist. Squadrons rarely spend less 
than their allotted amount, fearing a corresponding reduction 
in funding for subsequent years.  [Ref. 10, p. 2] 
This "use it or lose it" mentality is by no means unique 
to the squadrons of Air Wing Five. There is no incentive in 
the current system for commands to cut costs. However, with 
respect to the squadrons in Japan, this phenomenon can be used 
to account for consistently higher spending rates. Since 
these squadrons have always been more expensive to operate, 
that higher level of spending has evolved into the norm. Any 
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reversal of this trend is perceived as sending the wrong 
signal to funding authorities, thereby jeopardizing future 
funding levels. 
2. Training Facilities 
The training opportunities in Japan differ markedly from 
those afforded in the United States. Distances and transit 
times to training ranges and alternate airfields are much 
greater. Air Wing Five squadrons must often travel as far as 
Okinawa to complete field carrier landing practice, a 
prerequisite for any carrier operations. Because of the 
distances involved, squadrons frequently participate in 
detachments away from their home station to complete routine 
training evolutions. 
The lack of flight simulators for training purposes is 
also worthy of consideration. Several training requirements, 
such as annual NATOPS and instrument qualifications, must be 
conducted airborne. Although simulators are not a substitute 
for actual flight time, they are an effective complement in 
the areas of emergency procedures and refresher training [Ref. 
10, p. 50] . Since this option is not available in Japan, 
additional flight time is necessary for aircrews to meet the 
same levels of proficiency. 
3. Quality of Maintenance 
The training opportunities and facilities for maintenance 
personnel, both at the squadron and intermediate maintenance 
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levels, are also extremely limited in Japan. In addition, 
living and working conditions in Japan may not be considered 
"ideal" by all Navy personnel. As a result, the Navy's 
brightest and most talented maintenance technicians are not 
drawn to duty in Japan. These same individuals, by virtue of 
their accomplishments, usually have greater influence in 
choosing duty assignments. 
This is not meant to infer that maintenance personnel in 
Japan are not qualified or capable of completing all assigned 
tasks. It is merely an assertion that additional costs can be 
incurred when personnel are forced to learn "on the job". A 
significant portion of aircraft maintenance is diagnostic in 
nature, and higher levels of competence come only through 
experience. 
G.   FUNDING EFFECTS ON OTHER AIR WINGS 
Budget dollars for the Navy Flying Hour Program are a 
scarce resource. When they are required by one element of the 
program, they are not available for other purposes. If Air 
Wing Five is funded at a higher level, money available for 
other air wings is reduced. The budgeteers at the type 
commander level have some leeway to move funds that have been 
earmarked for other purposes but, over the recent "lean" 
years, most of these resources have been tapped. An example 
is the current scarcity of administrative dollars for travel 
and temporary duty. 
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Probably the most dramatic effect of funding Air Wing 
Five at a consistently higher level occurred in the last 
quarter of fiscal year 1994. During a period of significant 
budget shortfall, COMNAVAIRPAC was forced to stand down 
several squadrons completely, for a span of several months. 
This was done so that forward deployed units, at various 
trouble spots throughout the world, could continue to fly. 
Standing down a squadron for such a period of time has several 
negative impacts, most notably on readiness and morale. As 
the squadron begins flying again, safety becomes a significant 
issue and cause for concern.  [Ref. 7] 
Funding Air Wing Five at a higher level forces the 
remaining air wings to disproportionately bear the burden of 
unexpected budget shortfalls. Instead of cutting back 
uniformly, other squadrons are subject to stand downs and 




V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
There are four major factors that contribute to the 
higher costs per flight hour observed in Navy squadrons based 
in Japan. These factors are interrelated, and may be 
considered to be an unavoidable consequence of forward 
deployment. The major factors are a result of differences in 
the areas of: 
1. Logistics and support 
2. OPTEMPO 
3. Frequency of carrier operations 
4. Accounting treatment of flight hour costs 
All aspects of operating expenses, including fuel, 
maintenance, and miscellaneous costs are affected by these 
differences. Taken as a group, these factors account for 
approximately 90% of the observed cost variances. The 
remaining 10% is relegated to a group of intangible factors. 
These can be categorized as differences in spending habits, 
training opportunities, and quality of maintenance personnel. 
Consistently funding Air Wing Five at a higher level 
results in less money available for the remaining air wings. 
Therefore, additional funding to cover unexpected events or 
contingency operations must be drawn from other sources. 
Since it is not feasible to reduce funding for forward 
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deployed squadrons, both on the carrier and in Japan, CONUS 
squadrons suffer the brunt of funding reductions. This 
situation severely limits the options available to the budget 
officers at COMNAVAIRPAC. Drastic measures, such as standing 
down squadrons for excessive periods of time, can result from 
funding cutbacks or unexpected budget shortfalls. 
B.   SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
A close analysis of the Navy Flying Hour Program uncovers 
numerous questions and areas of uncertainty. The focus of 
this thesis is on a narrow sector of the overall program: 
cost per flight hour determination. Thus, it provides a 
perspective on only a few of the problems and challenges 
associated with the financing and support of Naval Aviation. 
Additional research in the following areas could prove 
beneficial to the future managers of the Flying Hour Program: 
• Is Cost Per Flight Hour (CPH) the most appropriate 
measure for use in planning and budgeting the resources 
of Naval Aviation? Fuel and other consumables are the 
only expenses that are closely tied to flight hours. 
Maintenance costs are prone to extreme fluctuations in 
the short-run. Are there other cost drivers that would 
be more accurate predictors of future costs? 
• Should a standardized accounting system be developed 
for use by naval air station comptrollers to categorize 
AOM costs? COMNAVAIRPAC currently requires subordinate 
activities to account for funds grouped under the Type 
Equipment Codes (TECs) assigned to each aircraft 
Type/Model/Series (TMS). Additional codes for 
squadrons, or individual aircraft bureau numbers 
(BUNOs), could simplify the task of tracking squadron 
costs at the type commander level. 
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Do the strategic benefits of stationing a carrier 
battle group in Japan outweigh the additional costs 
incurred? The decline in threat from the former 
Republics of the Soviet Union and other world events 
have significantly altered the threat environment since 
the first days the USS Midway was permanently assigned 
to Japan. In these days of downsizing and 
consolidation, would a cost/benefit analysis reveal 
that this arrangement is worthy of revisiting? While 
this arrangement is not based upon cost as other 
variables, political variables in particular, are 
relevant, cost may still be a significant 
consideration. 
How has the adoption of the Defense Business Operations 
Fund (DBOF) affected the operational costs of aviation 
units? The concept provides for support activities to 
achieve self-sufficiency by setting surcharge rates at 
a level to cover operating expenses. Initial feedback 
from customers of these DBOF activities indicates they 
are paying higher prices for the same parts and quality 
of service. Is there a plan to compensate the 
operational units for their loss of buying power, or at 
least acknowledge that this represents a reduction in 
funding? 
C.   CLOSING REMARKS 
This thesis has addressed factors that affect flight hour 
costs in Navy tactical squadrons. The factors that contribute 
to the higher costs in Japan are considered an unavoidable 
consequence of operating in that particular threat 
environment. This would seem to merit a budget adjustment at 
the NAVCOMPT level, as no distinction between air wings 
currently exists at that level. However, since increased 
funding probably will not be forthcoming in the near future, 
managers of the Flying Hour Program need to investigate other 
avenues for increasing efficiency and/or reducing expenses. 
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Managers also need to know when to send up a distress 
signal. The best example to date was the COMNAVAIRPAC 
decision in FY94 to stand down several squadrons when the 
money ran out. The message was heard clearly up the chain of 
command that additional funding was necessary to conduct 
operations effectively and safely. In the opinion of the 
Force Comptroller at COMNAVAIRPAC, aviators are quite often 
their own worst enemy. By maintaining a "can do" attitude 
when funding is cut below safe and reasonable limits, they may 
ensure that the lower level of budget becomes the new standard 
for the Fleet and NAVCOMPT. 
Therefore, managers must provide their cognizant budget 
authorities with a realistic assessment of the readiness and 
force levels that can be achieved by current funding levels. 
In these days of austere funding for defense programs, 
managers of the Navy Flying Hour Program must persevere in 
their efforts to maintain the high standards of Naval 
Aviation. 
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